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FOUR REFORMS 
FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
What follows are my top four suggestions for judicial action and advocacy that can result in urgently 
needed and readily achievable reforms. As the American Judicature Society and its members consider 
their agenda and mission for the coming years, each of these issues deserves their support. 
It is a considerable challenge, a 
distinct privilege, and no doubt a 
fool's errand to survey the past one 
hundred years in the field of crimi-
nal justice with the purpose of iden-
tifying trends and key issues that 
will critically challenge jurists who 
are concerned with reforming the 
system. I cannot pretend to possess 
by BARRY SCHECK 
a legal historian's breadth of knowl-
edge and remain a prisoner of my 
own professional and personal expe-
rience. That experience instructs, 
above all else, to be wary of observer 
bias. So it's best to make important 
aspects of that experience manifest 
from the beginning and warn that the 
views expressed here are entirely my 
own and should not be taken as the 
official position of any organization 
with which I am associated. 
I began practicing criminal law in 
1975 as a Legal Aid lawyer (public 
defender) in the South Bronx, inspired 
by the civil rights movement and the 
landmark criminal justice rulings of 
the Warren Court. At that time, New 
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York City was experiencing a finan-
cial crisis: The Association of Legal 
Aid Attorneys had formed a union and 
was striking to assure that lawyers 
had access to telephones, office space, 
vertical representation (the right to 
represent clients from arrest to dis-
position), and that some limitations 
were put on caseloads, which were 
spiraling out of control. The process 
of "early case assessment" had just 
begun-screening by a bureau of 
district attorneys of the initial state-
ments from officers and witnesses, 
case severity (breaking down non-
violent felonies to misdemeanors), 
and case strength. This was just the 
first salvo in a trend over the next 
three decades that shifted initial 
access to information and assessment 
of cases for purposes of early plea bar-
gaining and setting of bail away from 
judges and into a domain more exclu-
sively supervised by prosecutors. The 
crack cocaine epidemic was nascent 
and the movement towards deter-
minant sentencing and mandatory 
minimums was taking hold, again sig-
naling the coming shift in the power 
over sentencing away from judges to 
prosecutors. Charles E. Silberman's 
sweeping and insightful overview of 
the system in 1980, Criminal Violence, 
Criminal Justice,1 perfectly captured 
the era and holds up to this day. 
By the time I began teaching law, 
practicing in federal courts, and 
helping construct in-house clinical 
programs that trained both prosecu-
tors and defense attorneys (1979), 
1 was inhabiting a world without 
federal sentencing guidelines, cell 
phones, personal computers, or the 
internet, much less DNA technol-
ogy, sophisticated neuroimaging, or 
the crunching of "big data." I have 
been fortunate to have a diverse 
practice and participated in heavily 
publicized proceedings including 
civil rights suits against both police 
departments and prosecutors. I have 
defended clients, in state and federal 
court, at trials and on appeal, who 
were accused of a myriad of crimes.2 
Perhaps most important of all, for 
the past 24 years, I have been lucky 
enough to be part of the "innocence 
movement" and to work intimately 
with a collection of lawyers ( defense 
and prosecution), judges, scholars, 
and scientists who have litigated, 
adjudicated, and studied an unprece-
dented wave of "exonerations" based 
on DNA tests and other new evidence 
of innocence. 
So having quickly summarized my 
experience and potential observa-
tional bias, what follows are my top 
four suggestions for judicial action 
and advocacy that can result in 
urgently needed and readily achiev-
able reforms. As the American Judi-
cature Society and its members 
consider its agenda and mission 
for the coming years, each of these 
issues deserves support. 
Lead on Indigent Defense Reform 
In this 50th anniversary year of the 
Gideon 3 decision, there is no area 
of criminal justice reform that has 
made less progress over the last 
century or is more significant for 
improving the system than the right 
to counsel. Without adequate counsel 
for the poor one cannot even begin to 
effectuate meaningful solutions to 
the debilitating problems posed by 
mass incarceration, over-criminal-
ization, and racial bias. "Problem-
solving courts," whether targeting 
drugs, juveniles, family violence, or 
communities, work best when there 
are quality defense teams (not just 
lawyers, but investigators, para-
legals, and social workers) who 
can counsel clients and their fami-
lies "holistically." Strong indigent 
defense does not just provide assur-
ance the innocent are protected and 
abuses by the state are exposed, but 
holds families together, helps addicts 
stay sober, keeps young offenders 
in school, facilitates re-entry from 
prison, and supports public safety 
in communities.4 Viewed from this 
perspective, indigent defense reform 
is a cause that should, and still can, 
garner bipartisan political support 
and appeal across class and racial 
divides. 
But indigent defense remains the 
neglected stepchild of the criminal 
justice system. 5 It lacks a natural 
base, a core constituency with legisla-
tive influence-poor people charged 
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with crimes, often disenfranchised 
by criminal convictions, and dispro-
portionately from racial minorities, 
have limited political power in the 
first place. And there is a vicious cycle 
at work as well-the worse the rep-
resentation of institutional defend-
ers and court-appointed counsel, the 
less the community wants to rally for 
a larger defender budget or higher 
counsel fees. Nothing erodes respect 
for our criminal justice system more 
than the widespread conventional 
wisdom that one is better off being 
rich, white, and guilty than poor, 
black or brown, and innocent. 
As David Cole has pointed out, 
"[a]t least every five years since 
Gideon was decided, a major study 
has been released finding that indi-
gent defense is inadequate."6 There 
are good reasons, however, on this 
50th anniversary of Gideon to see 
this ongoing crisis in funding ade-
quate indigent defense as reaching 
a qualitatively different breaking 
point. One reason is the phenomenon 
of "mass incarceration" in the United 
States. As we approach a million new 
felony convictions per year, it must 
be emphasized that without anything 
close to a corresponding allocation 
of resources to the indigent defense 
function, there has been a six-fold 
increase in incarceration rates over 
the past 30 years, going from 100 
to almost 700 incarcerated persons 
per 100,000 people, "a percentage 
unprecedented in American history 
and among industrialized nations."7 
1. New York, NY: Vintage Press 1980. 
2. These crimes include murder, narcotics 
distribution, organized crime activities, child 
abuse, domestic and foreign "terrorism" cases, 
as well as crime victims whose testimony was 
essential to making high profile state and federal 
prosecutions. 
3. Gideon v. Wainwright 372 US 335 (1963) . 
4. See Robin G. Steinberg, Beyond Lawyer-
ing: How Holistic Representation Makes for Good 
Policy, Better Lawyers, and More Satisfied Clients, 
30 NYU REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 625 (2005-2006). 
5. For a blistering but all too accurate reflec-
tion on Gideon's anniversary, see Stephen B. 
Bright, Sia M. Sanneh, Fifty Years of Defiance and 
Resistance After Gideon V. Wainwright, forthcom-
ing at 122 YALE L.J. -- (2013). 
6. David Cole, No EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND 
CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SYSTEM 64 (Mankato, MN: The New Press 2000). 
7. Darryl K. Brown, The Decline of Defense 
Counsel and the Rise of Accuracy in Criminal Adju-
dication, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1585, 1595. 
A second reason is growing recogni-
tion that while innocent people do 
plead guilty to felonies, the innocent 
confess in much greater numbers to 
misdemeanors8 without the benefit 
of counsel who are funded to conduct 
independent investigations, if they 
get counsel.9 There has always been a 
tendency toward "the process being 
the punishment" in misdemeanor 
courts10-pieas of time served for 
those who cannot make bail or who 
come back to court numerous times 
to get a trial on the merits-but with 
the advent of "broken windows" 
policing policies the number of mis-
demeanor prosecutions has dra-
matically risen.11 "It is time," Gerald 
Kogan, former Chief Justice of the 
Florida Supreme Court recently 
observed, "to end the wasteful and 
harmful practices that have turned 
our misdemeanor courts into mind-
less conviction mills."12 
Steve Hanlon, for many years a 
partner at Holland & Knight and 
current chair of the ABA's Defense 
Advisory Group to the Standing 
Committee on Indigent Defense and 
Legal Aid, summarizes the situation 
with empathy for all, but with unvar-
nished realism: 
Despite the heroic, indeed Sisyphean 
efforts of individual public defenders, 
the harsh truth is that every day in 
thousands of courtrooms across this 
nation, public defenders "meet 'em 
and plead 'em," spending precious 
8. See John H. Blume & Rebecca K. Helm, 
The Unexonerated: Factually Innocent Defen-
dants Who Plead Guilty 16-17 (Cornell Legal 
Studies Research Paper 2012), http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=2103787 ("(l]nnocent persons charged 
with relatively minor offenses often plead guilty 
in order to get out of jail, to avoid the hassle 
of having criminal charges hanging over their 
heads, or to avoid being punished for exercising 
their right to trial."); see also When the Innocent 
Plead Guilty, http://www.innocenceproject.org/ 
Content/When_the_lnnocent_Plead_Guilty.php, 
last accessed June 1, 2013. 
9. Standing Comm. on Legal Aid & Indigent 
Def., Gideon's Broken Promise: America's Con-





10. Malcom M. Feeley, THE PRO CESS Is THE 
PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN LOWER CRIMI-
NAL COURT (New York, NY: Russell Sage 1979). 
11. Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter, 
45 UC DAVIS L. REV. 277, 282 (2011). 
12. Id., at 279. 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 
a landmark Warren 
Court decision, 
guaranteed indigent 
defendants counsel in 
state courts. 
THE U.S. NATIONAL ARCHIVES 
"Mr. Gideon, I am sorry, 
but I cannot appoint Counsel 
to represent you in this case. 
Under the laws of the State of 
Florida, the only time a Court can 
appoint Counsel to represent a 
Defendant is when that person is 
charged with a capital offense. 
I am sorry, but I will have to deny 
your request to appoint Counsel 
to defend you in this case." 
-Judge Robert McGrary of the Florida Court, 1961 
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few minutes with their clients, as 
their offices triage cases by shifting 
resources to higher-risk cases (e.g., 
homicides and sex offenses). And 
every day in thousands of courtrooms 
throughout this nation, prosecutors 
secure uncounseled waivers of 
counsel and uncounseled guilty 
pleas from criminal defendants with 
little education or understanding 
about the criminal justice system, 
especially the devastating collateral 
effects of those very guilty pleas. 
Indeed, a compelling argument 
could be made that the principal 
function of all of the players in the 
criminal justice system with respect 
to the invariably poor and largely 
black and brown population appear-
ing before them is to serve as a facili-
tator for the mass over-incarceration 
of a nation that now incarcerates a 
greater proportion of its population 
than any other nation in the world. 
This sad state of affairs is or should 
be well known to all of our courts, 
especially our state supreme courts, 
most of them charged under their 
state constitutions with a power of 
general superintendence or equiva-
lent responsibility over the entire 
justice system in their states. 
This is the legacy of our genera-
tion of judges, lawyers, governors, 
and legislators, like it or not. This 
happened on our watch. Our grand-
children will undoubtedly ask us how 
and why this happened. 13 
The judiciary has a special respon-
sibility to ensure indigent defense 
systems are truly functional. That 
responsibility can no longer be 
deferred or abdicated on separation-
of-powers grounds, as has so often 
happened over the past two decades, 
in adjudicating "systemic ineffec-
tiveness" litigation. On the contrary, 
as Martin Guggenheim has recently 
argued, the crisis has reached a point 
where separation-of-powers consid-
erations compel the opposite result.14 
When indigent defense funding is so 
inadequate that lawyers cannot even 
conduct investigations of cases on a 
regular basis, the executive branch 
accumulates too much unchecked 
power to prosecute and to influence 
the outcomes on grounds other than 
the merits, and, as a consequence, 
the judicial branch is denied its duty 
to decide cases independently. This 
argument views the Sixth Amend-
ment's right to counsel as a "struc-
tural protection" for everyone's 
rights, including those never pros-
ecuted or arrested.15 
This formulation resonates with 
lessons learned from the "innocence 
movement" and wrongful conviction 
cases. Take, for example, crime labo-
ratory scandals. A series of large-
scale audits have now documented 
that for decades forensic analysts 
such as Fred Zain (West Virginia), 
Joyce Gilchrist (Oklahoma), and Jim 
Bolding (Houston, Texas) got away 
with either 'dry Jabbing' (not doing 
the tests at all-just giving results) 
or making repeated and obvious 
errors because the defender system 
simply lacked the capacity to inves-
tigate and expose these problems.16 
Prosecutors, of course, must take 
some responsibility for uncritically 
accepting "structural" dysfunction 
at crime laboratories despite the 
fact that it helped "make" their cases 
against defendants they believed 
were guilty. The adversary system, 
however, quite correctly assumes the 
defense counsel ought to be the first 
line of protection in exposing foren-
sic error and misconduct so that the 
judiciary can do something about it. 
This breakdown in the adversary 
system did not just lead to many con-
victions of the innocent and failure to 
apprehend the guilty, but rendered 
the courts incapable of knowing 
there was not a valid factual basis for 
innumerable guilty pleas and convic-
tions after trial. The same analysis 
applies to police and prosecutorial 
misconduct-unchecked abuses of 
the executive branch the defense 
function is primarily responsible for 
detecting. 
Expect, along these same lines, a 
new surge of "systemic ineffective-
ness" lawsuits that will begin with 
individual defense lawyers and/or 
institutional defenders declaring 
themselves "unavailable" to take 
additional assignments because of 
excessive caseloads or lack of inves-
tigative resources. As opposed to 
previous large, affirmative class 
actions that sought to invalidate 
entire systems, litigation that begins 
in this fashion can directly and 
immediately rely on defenses firmly 
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grounded in state ethical rules as 
well as "structural" state and federal 
constitutional arguments.17 Dean 
Norm Lefstein, probably our leading 
authority on the indigent defense 
issues in the United States, has just 
written an Executive Summary and 
Recommendations to accompany his 
book, Securing Reasonable Caseloads: 
Ethics and Law in Public Defense, 
where he lays out a roadmap detail-
ing exactly how and why these law-
suits can be brought successfully.18 
Former FBI Director and Federal 
Judge William Sessions describes it 
as a "wake up call for all of us, par-
ticularly for lawyers and judges who 
have taken an oath that we will never 
reject or ignore the causes of the 
oppressed or defenseless." "For too 
long," Judge Sessions acknowledges, 
"we have tolerated, through igno-
rance or design, systems of indigent 
defense that violate the Constitu-
tion, our own Rules of Professional 
Conduct, and common standards of 
human decency." 19 
The way the Florida Supreme 
Court just dealt with this issue in 
Public Defender of the Eleventh judicial 
District, et. al. v. Florida 20 is instruc-
tive, if not exemplary. The public 
defender in the 11th Judicial District 
filed motions in 21 cases certifying 
a conflict of interest in each case, 
claiming that excessive caseloads 
13. Needed: A Cultural Revolution, http://www. 
americanbar.org/publications/human_rights_ 
mag a zi ne_home/2013_ vol_ 39 /vol_ 3 0_no_ 4 _ 
gideon/needed_a_cultural_revolution.html. 
14. Martin Guggenheim, The People's Right to 
a Well-Funded Indigent Defender System, 36 NYU 
REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 395 (2012). 
15. Id., at 401. 
16. See https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/ 
displayArticle.aspx?articleid=22698&AspxAuto 
DetectCookieSupport=1, last accessed on June 
4, 2013. 
17. See State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780 (La. 
1993); State ex rel. Mo. Pub. Defender Comm'n v. 
Waters, 370 S.W.3d 592 (Mo. 2012); DeWolfe v. 
Richmond, 2012 WL 10853 (Md. Jan. 4, 2012); 
Hurrell-Harring v. State, 930 N.E.2d 217 (N.Y. 
2010); Stephen F. Hanlon, State Constitutional 
Challenges to Indigent Defense Systems, 75 Mo. L. 
Rev. 751 (2010). 
18. See Chapter 7, Executive Summary and 
Recommendations to Securing Reasonable Case-
loads, ava ilable at http://www.indigentdefense. 
org. 
19. Id., at vii. 
20. Public Defender of the Eleventh Judicial 
District, et. al. v. Florida No. SCl0-1349 (May 
23. 2013). 
21. Id., at 10. 
caused by underfunding meant the 
office could not carry out its legal and 
ethical obligations to the defendants. 
Florida Supreme Court, before reach-
ing the merits, had to contend with a 
new Florida statute where the legis-
lature made clear that "[i]n no case 
shall the court approve a withdrawal 
by the public defender based solely 
upon the inadequacy of funding 
or excess workload."21 Citing prior 
cases where it granted compensa-
tion to counsel in excess of statutory 
fee schedules under extraordinary 
circumstances, the Court explicitly 
embraced a separation-of-powers 
argument as the basis for reaching 
the systemic ineffectiveness issue: 
"This doctrine of inherent judicial 
power 'exists because it is crucial 
to the survival of the judiciary as 
an independent, functioning, and 
coequal branch of government."22 
It also rejected the argument that 
courts should address the problem 
on a piecemeal case-by-case basis as 
"wasteful," "redundant," and "tan-
tamount to applying a Band-Aid to 
an open head wound."23 Ultimately, 
the Court held that, notwithstand-
ing a clear legislative enactment to 
the contrary, the public defender's 
declaration of unavailability due to 
excessive caseload would be upheld 
upon a showing of "a substantial risk 
that representation of [one] or more 
clients will be materially limited 
by the lawyer's responsibilities to 
another client."24 
Leaders of the judiciary should 
not wait for systemic ineffective-
ness cases to be brought to address 
22. ld. , at 17. 
23 . ld., at 25 
24. Id., at 26. 
25. See ABA Ten Principles of Public Defense 
Delivery Systems (2002). 
26. See ABA Eight Guidelines of Public Defense 
Related to Excessive Workloads at 6 (2009). 
27. See Deborah Leff and Melanca Clark, Doing 
Justice to Gideon, 39 ABA HUMAN RIGHTS 7 (April 
2013). 
28. Id., at 9. 
29. For example, it would be a good idea 
for institutional defenders should to keep time 
sheets so that they can make a better case 
in requesting funds or documenting why they 
cannot take additional cases in the context of 
systemic ineffectiveness litigation. See Hanlon, 
Supra n.13; Jenna Greene, Counting the Hours, 
NAT'L L.J . 05/27/2013 . 
30. 373 us 83 (1963). 
the indigent crisis if they exercise, 
directly or indirectly, pursuant to 
state or local statutes, supervisory 
authority over court-appointed 
lawyer systems. Court-appointed 
lawyer systems often serve more of 
the indigent in a jurisdiction than 
institutional defenders, but usually 
lack a supervisory infrastructure 
that does much more than ensure 
attorneys are not improperly billing. 
There are rarely, if ever, systematic 
audits of other cases after court-
appointed lawyers are found to be 
ineffective in one matter; and there 
are rarely, if ever, systematic audits 
of lawyers who chronically fail to 
seek appointment of experts, inves-
tigators, or visit incarcerated clients 
to assess the quality of whatever 
representation was provided. This 
is simply unacceptable in a digital 
age where the practical and financial 
barriers to gathering and tracking 
this kind of information have fallen 
dramatically. 
Before briefly commenting on 
what the judges can do about court-
appointed lawyer systems they 
administer, it is important to empha-
size, as AJS has long acknowledged, 
that judges should not be in charge 
of court-appointed lawyer systems 
at all. The ABA's Ten Principles of 
Public Defense Delivery Systems 
makes clear that the public defense 
function, including the selection, 
funding, and payment of defense 
counsel, be independent of the judi-
ciary (Principle 1); that indigent-
defense counsel should have a parity 
of resources with the prosecution 
(Principle 8); and defense counsel 
should be supervised and system-
atically reviewed for quality and effi-
ciency according to nationally and 
locally adopted standards (Principle 
10).25 AJS co-sponsored the ABA Eight 
Guidelines of Public Defense Related 
to Excessive Workloads, which was 
approved by the ABA House of Del-
egates in 2009, including the com-
mentary to Guideline 2 which reads, 
"[t]he ABA endorses complete inde-
pendence of the defense function, 
in which the judiciary is neither 
involved in the selection of counsel 
or their supervision."26 Nonetheless, 
chief administrative judges who are 
responsible court-appointed lawyer 
systems should use their super-
visory powers to create indepen-
dent structures consistent with the 
Ten Principles to oversee how the 
system functions. The appointment 
of special masters or commissioners 
would be one mechanism; outreach 
to law schools, independent com-
mittees of state bar associations, 
or appropriate nonprofits could be 
another. 
In terms of securing funding and 
resources, judges should not only 
support indigent defense reform 
within their states but also assist 
the defense community in getting 
its fair share of federal funding. 
The Department of Justice (DOJ) 
is actively soliciting proposals to 
assist states and localities improve 
the quality of indigent defense ser-
vices including innovative data 
collection to assess the quality of 
court-appointed counsel. 27 Most 
importantly, DOJ wants the defense 
community to have a seat at the 
table and be a beneficiary of "block" 
grants through the Edward Byrne 
Memorial Justice Assistance Grant 
Program, its largest grant program; 
it allocated nearly $300 million 
to states and localities in 2012. 28 
Judges should use their influence 
to make that a reality, not an empty 
promise. 
In short, judges simply have to 
lead and be proactive, even forcing 
the defense community to change its 
culture and take steps it resists, like 
keeping timesheets, so that it can 
get a fair share of resources. 29 The 
enhancement of indigent defense is 
the linchpin reform that makes all 
other improvements in the criminal 
justice system achievable. It should 
be the judiciary's highest priority 
and certainly an area that would 
benefit from the support of AJS. 
Issue "Ethical Rule" Orders and 
Enforce Them Through Contempt 
Citations 
On this 100th anniversary of AJS and 
the 50th anniversary of Bradyv. Mary-
land, 30 I would ask AJS to consider 
advocating for the simple proposal 
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I have put forward with the Hon. 
Nancy Gertner. 31 We call it the 
"ethical rule" order, and, given its 
simplicity, we hope judges will come 
to view it as an Occam's razor for the 
disclosure of exculpatory informa-
tion. Every state and federal judge 
in the United States has the author-
ity to issue an "ethical rule" order 
now. It is founded upon state ethical 
rules binding state prosecutors and 
forms the basis of local federal court 
rules governing federal prosecutors. 
Judges do not have to wait for a new 
statute to be passed, a new regula-
tion to be promulgated, or even a 
motion from defense counsel-it 
can and, I would argue, should be a 
standing order. Ethical prosecutors 
ought be receptive because it pro-
vides clarity to a disclosure obliga-
tion that has remained unnecessarily 
murky for decades. 
Forty-nine states, Guam, the 
United States Virgin Islands, and the 
District of Columbia, all have adopted 
a version of ABA Model Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct Rule 3.8 (Special 
Responsibilities of a Prosecutor)32 
that requires prosecutors to disclose, 
pre-trial, all evidence that "tends to 
negate the guilt of the accused or 
mitigates the offense."33 The ABA has 
made it plain that this disclosure obli-
gation is "separate from and broader 
than the Brady constitutional stan-
dards."34 Viewed from a pre-trial 
perspective, the Brady constitutional 
standard covers a) information that 
a prosecutor knows or should know 
about (including information in law 
enforcement files that the prosecutor 
doesn't personally possess), 35 and b) 
information that an appellate court, 
post conviction, would regard as so 
important ("material") that failure 
to disclose it requires a reversal and 
a new trial.36 Plainly, as many have 
observed, this "constitutional" obli-
gation is not particularly helpful to 
anyone trying to comply pre-trial-
be it the prosecutor, defense counsel, 
or the court wondering whether 
something is 'Brady.' It was for this 
very reason the ABA devised Rule 
3.8(d) to be unambiguously broad: 
Rule 3.B(d) requires a prosecutor 
to "make timely disclosure to the 
defense of all evidence or information 
known to the prosecutor that tends 
to negate the guilt of the accused or 
mitigates the offense, and, in connec-
31. See "How to Rein In Rogue Prosecutors: What 
Happened to Ted Stevens Will Keep Happening 
to Ordinary Americans Unless Judges Change the 
Rules." Wall Street Journal Op Ed, March 15, 2012. 
Judge Gertner has retired from federal bench 
where she sat in the Northern District of Massa-
chusetts and now teaches as a Professor of Prac-
tice at Harvard Law School. She is also of counsel 
to Neufeld, Scheck, and Brustin, a civil rights law 
firm. Another version of this reform proposal will 
appear in a forthcoming issue of The Champion, a 
publication of the National Association of Crimi-
nal Defense Lawyers, so hopefully judges who do 
not issue standing ethical rule orders can expect 
motions requesting them. 
32. ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics & Prof'! 
Responsibility, Formal Op. 09-454 (2009). Cali-
fornia is the only state that has not adopted 
attorney ethics codes that are substantially 
similar to the ABA Model Rule. David Keenan, 
Deborah Jane Cooper, David Lebowitz & Tamar 
Lerer, The Myth of Prosecutorial Accountability 
after Connick v. Thompson: Why Existing Profes-
sional Responsibility Measures Cannot Protect 
Against Prosecutorial Misconduct, 121 YALE L. J. 
ONLINE 203, 222. California has its own ethical 
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tion with sentencing, [to] disclose 
to the defense and to the tribunal 
all unprivileged mitigating informa-
tion known to the prosecutor."37 At 
rules that differ substantially from the Model 
Rule and that do not have an equivalent to the 
ABA Model Rule. Id. , at 222, n. 95. However, Cali-
fornia's Rules of Professional Conduct address 
certain important aspects of a prosecutor's pro-
fessional duties including a rule regarding sup-
pression of evidence. Id. (citing CAL. R. PRoF'L 
CONDUCT 5-100 ("Threatening Criminal, Admin-
istrative, or Disciplinary Charges"); R. 5-120 
("Trial Publicity"); R. 5-200 ("Suppression of 
Evidence"); R. 5-300 ("Contact with Officials"); 
R. 5-310 ("Prohibited Contact with Witnesses"); 
R. 5-320 ("Contact with Jurors"). 
33 . MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT 
3.8 (1983). For updated version, see http:// 
www. am er i can bar.or g /groups/pro fe s-
s ion a l_res pons i bi Ii ty /p u bl i cations/ 
model_rules_of_professional_conduct/model_ 
r u I es _ of _profession a I_ conduct _ tab I e _of_ 
contents.html. 
34. Amicus Brief of ABA at 1, Smith v. Cain, No. 
10-8145 (U.S. August 19, 2011). 
35. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995); 
See also Smith v. Cain, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 576, 575 
36. Supra n. 27 at 87. 
37. Supra n. 33. 
ARTVII 
the same time, it provides an escape 
clause for in camera production when 
timely disclosure could endanger a 
witness or otherwise unfairly preju-
dice the prosecution before trial. 38 
Accordingly, an "ethical order" 
should be very straightforward: It 
should track the relevant ethical rule 
of the jurisdiction and direct a pros-
ecutor to search her file and verify 
that she has disclosed all informa-
tion that "tends to negate the guilt of 
the accused or mitigates the offense." 
If there is a relevant police file, the 
order could also direct a search of it 
and a similar disclosure. The order 
could also request the prosecutor 
to disclose, on the record or reduce 
to writing, all favorable oral state-
ments she discovers when inter-
viewing witnesses. Again, tracking 
the ethical rule, the order should 
include a safe-harbor provision that 
allows the prosecutor to delay disclo-
sure by making an in camera ex parte 
production of the information and a 
showing of "good cause," such as real 
evidence that witnesses are at risk or 
perjury will be suborned. The order 
should also provide for in camera 
ex parte production of information 
when the prosecutor is uncertain 
about whether it tends to negate 
guilt or mitigate punishment. 
When the ethical rule order should 
be issued is a question that may turn, 
to some extent, on the practices of 
a jurisdiction and local statutes. If 
there is, by custom or statute, "open 
file" discovery or disclosure of prior 
statements by witnesses before 
38. See Id., at 3 (1983). Massachusetts has 
provided specific guidance in its rules of profes-
sional conduct, stating that "[i]f the disclosure 
of privileged or prejudicial information is nec-
essary, the lawyer shall make an application 
to withdraw ex parte to a judge other than the 
judge who will preside at the trial and shall seek 
to be heard in camera". MASS. R. PROF'L CONDUCT 
3.3 (2013). http://www.mass.gov/obcbbo/rpc3. 
htm#Rule%203.3. 
39. See United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 
633 (2002). Please note, however, that Ruiz 
should not be read as allowing "material" proof 
of innocence to be withheld. See also Green, 
Federal Criminal Discovery Reform: A Legislative 
Approach, 64 MERCER L. REV. 639, at 648-49 
(April 2013) for an insightful discussion on the 
conflict between the right of the defense to 
early disclosure of favorable evidence and the 
prosecutor 's statutory authority to withhold 
impeachment evidence. 
***************************** 
WE HOPE JUDGES WILL COME TO 
VIEW ETHICAL RULE ORDERS AS AN 
OCCAM'S RAZOR FOR THE DISCLOSURE 
OF EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE. 
***************************** 
they testify at trial, then it will be 
easier to issue the order early in the 
process with a caveat that disclosure 
of favorable evidence is a continuing 
obligation. There may be resistance 
to issuance of the order very early 
in the processing of a case, particu-
larly before an early guilty plea, on 
the grounds that the prosecutor may 
not be familiar at that point with 
everything in her file or the relevant 
police files, and there is no constitu-
tional requirement to disclose mere 
impeachment material to a grand 
jury or before a guilty plea. 39 
Finally, the order should clearly 
state that "willful and deliberate 
failure to comply" is punishable by 
contempt. This provision is very 
important and carefully worded. It 
means that negligent, inexperienced, 
stupid, even reckless prosecutors 
will not be held in contempt. But 
frankly, given the mens rea require-
ments in most jurisdictions and the 
realities of criminal practice, the 
only prosecutors who should be held 
in contempt for violating the ethical 
rule order are those who do so will-
fully and deliberately. Based on 
discussions with leaders in the pros-
ecutorial community and the judi-
ciary, we think there is widespread 
agreement that the handful of prose-
cutors who deliberately and willfully 
suppress favorable evidence, even 
in "harmless error" cases, should be 
sanctioned for purposes of deter-
rence alone. It is the repeat offender, 
· the prosecutor who routinely makes 
untimely disclosure of Brady mate-
rial in the middle of trial, or is caught 
more than once hiding evidence that 
is plainly exculpatory, who is most at 
risk of being sanctioned. 
Prosecutors may be startled at 
first upon seeing the ethical rule 
motion as opposed to the usual, 
general directive to turn over all 
Brady/Kyles material, but upon 
reflection, they should come to accept 
and perhaps even welcome it as a sal-
utary measure that helps train new 
prosecutors and identifies the 'bad 
apples' who bring discredit to the 
profession. Moreover, what can they 
credibly say in opposition? The State 
doesn't recognize the ethical rule, 
invariably a state statutory obliga-
tion, as binding? The State doesn't 
believe it is right or fair to be ordered 
to obey an ethical rule that is clear 
and broad as opposed to the "con-
stitutional" Brady obligation that is 
ambiguous and narrow? Or, the State 
doesn't want to be ordered to follow 
the ethical rule because a violation 
later deemed to be knowing, deliber-
ate, and malicious could result in a 
contempt proceeding, civil or crimi-
nal, and possibly bar discipline? 
A more likely and politick response 
would be: Trust us; when follow-
ing our constitutional obligation to 
turn over all Brady/Kyles material, 
the State will meet its ethical obliga-
tion to disclose all information that 
"negates guilt or mitigates punish-
ment." The problem with that argu-
ment, however, is that it concedes 
that the ethical rule should be fol-
lowed. Judges should explain that an 
order mandating the enforcement 
of the State's ethical rule is not a 
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personal accusation against a par-
ticular prosecutor or office, but a 
principled position to address what 
we now know to have happened 
too often. Brady/Kyles violations do 
happen; scores of innocent people 
have been convicted by those vio-
lations. This is not to say the pros-
ecutorial misconduct is epidemic, 
but it seems fair to characterize it 
as more than episodic. The follow-
ing footnote contains just some of 
the recent cases, press reports, and 
law review articles highlighting the 
Brady abuses that have influenced 
public discourse.40 And even if one 
were to assume prosecutorial mis-
conduct and the suppression of Brady 
material is just episodic, exaggerated 
by media exposes, or limited to just 
a few outlier jurisdictions, that's all 
the more reason to applaud ethical 
rule orders as a way to bolster public 
confidence in the integrity of the 
process. 
Some readers may be wonder-
ing at this point where the idea for 
the ethical rule order came from 
and whether there is any evidence 
it will work. Two high-profile Brady 
cases provide an answer-the col-
lapse of the prosecution of Senator 
Ted Stevens in Washington, D.C., and 
the Michael Morton exoneration in 
Texas. 
Former Alaskan Senator Ted 
Stevens was indicted and found 
guilty of receiving benefits and other 
things of value from VECO Corpora-
tion, Bill Allen, the VECO CEO, and 
two other individuals; concealing 
receipt of such benefits; and failing 
to disclose receipt of such benefits on 
annual Financial Disclosure Forms.41 
The Department of Justice moved to 
set aside the verdict and to dismiss 
the indictment with prejudice when 
DOJ attorneys discovered during 
post-trial litigation "significant, 
undisclosed Brady/Giglio informa-
tion in prosecutors' notes of state-
ments by the government's principal 
witness, Bill Allen."42 The presiding 
U.S. District Judge Emmet G. Sul-
livan granted the DOJ's motion and 
dismissed the indictment with preju-
dice, and, on the same day, appointed 
Henry F. Schuelke III "to investigate 
and prosecute such criminal co'n-
tempt proceedings as may be appro-
priate" against the six prosecutors 
who conducted the investigation and 
trial of Senator Stevens.43 Schuelke 
found "evidence that compels the 
conclusion, and would prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt," that Joseph 
Bottini and James Goeke, both assis-
tant U.S. attorneys in the Alaska 
U.S. Attorney's Office, "intentionally 
withheld ... Brady information from 
the attorneys for Senator Stevens."44 
However, Schuelke did not recom-
mend prosecution of Bottini and 
Goeke for criminal contempt because 
[a]lthough the evidence establishes 
that this misconduct was intentional, 
the evidence is insufficient to estab-
lish beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Mr. Bottini and Mr. Goeke violated the 
criminal contempt statute, 18 U.S.C. § 
401, which requires the intentional 
violation of a clear and unambigu-
ous order. Although a reading of the 
transcripts of numerous hearings 
and proceedings before and during 
the trial establish that Judge Sul-
livan intended that all Brady and 
Giglio material be produced, none of 
the orders issued by Judge Sullivan, 
before or during the trial, specifically 
directed the prosecutors to disclose 
40. The two highly publicized Supreme 
Court cases, Connick v. Thompson 563 US __ _ 
(2011) and Smith v. Cain 565 US __ (2010), 
both involved significant and disturbing fail -
ures to disclose exculpatory information to 
the defense in Orleans Parish as required in 
Kyles v. Whitley, the landmark Brady case, (373 
U.S. 83 (1963)), of the modern era that also 
originated in Orleans Parish. In Ellen Yaroshef-
sky's examination of changes to the Brady 
policies of the New Orleans District Attorney's 
Office post-Kyles, she found disclosure viola-
tions persist for reasons that are not neces-
sarily unique to the jurisdiction. See Ellen 
Yaroshefsky, New Orleans Prosecutorial Dis-
closure in Practice After Connick v. Thompson, 
ZS GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 913, 913, 914-915 and 
917 (2012). After noting that former Alaska 
Senator Ted Stevens's guilty verdict on corrup-
tion charges was thrown out following revela-
tions that the prosecutors had withheld crucial 
evidence, the trial court "ultimately instructed 
the jury that the DOJ lawyers had failed to 
meet their obligation to disclose evidence to 
the defendants." In response to another federal 
prosecutor's disclosure violation, a U.S . Chief 
District Judge of Massachusetts initiated dis-
ciplinary proceedings and the court's opinion 
summarized "close to 70 published federal 
court decis ions involving federal prosecutors' 
nondisclosure or belated disclosure of discov-
ery material." Bruce Green concluded "it seems 
only logical to assume that the cases of disclo-
sure error that have surfaced are just the tip of 
the iceberg, given how difficult it is to discover 
such errors after-the-fact." Bruce A. Green, 
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all Brady/Giglio information in their 
possession. In large part, this was 
because of representations made by 
prosecutors to the Court that such an 
order was unnecessary.45 
When the issue was raised, Judge 
Sullivan indicated that he would 
just "issue an order as a general 
reminder to the government of its 
daily ongoing obligation to produce 
[Brady] material" and state that he 
was "convinced that the government 
in its team of prosecutors is thor-
oughly familiar with the decisions 
from our Circuit and from my col-
leagues on this Court, and that they, 
in good faith, know that they have 
an obligation, on an ongoing basis 
to provide the relevant, appropriate 
information to defense counsel to 
be utilized in a usable format as that 
information becomes known or in 
possession of the government.''46 
In stark contrast to the Stevens 
case, Michael Morton's 1987 wrong-
ful conviction for murdering his wife 
also involved numerous Brady viola-
tions, but it was preceded by a spe-
cific motion and direct court order to 
turn over all reports and notes of the 
lead investigator, Sgt. Don Wood, for 
Beyond Training Prosecutors about their Disclo-
sure Obligations: Can Prosecutors' Offices Learn 
from their Lawyers' Mistakes?, 31 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 2161, 2161-2162 and 2175 (2010) . The 
Veritas Initiative concluded in a comprehen-
sive 2010 report that Brady violations are 
among the most pervasive forms of prosecuto-
rial misconduct. Kathleen M. Ridolfi & Maurice 
Passley, PREVENTABLE ERROR: A REPORT ON 
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN CALIFORNIA 
1997-2009, (2010) http ://www.veritasinitia-
tive.org/our-work/prosecutorial-misconduct/ 
p m-p reven table-error- a- rep or t-o n-prose cu -
torial-misconduct-in-california/. USA Today 
conducted an investigation of federal pros-
ecutorial misconduct and published a series of 
articles in 2010 discussing the lack of reper-
cussions for prosecutors that engage in prose-
cutorial misconduct and highlighted numerous 
cases involving Brady violations. (Brad Heath 
and Kevin McCoy, Prosecutor misconduct lets 
convicted off easy, USA TODAY, Dec. 28, 2010, 
http:/ /usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/wash-
ington/j udicial/2010-12-2 8-1 Aprosecutorpun-
ish 28 _ CV _N .htm). This list could continue for 
several pages; these are just a few examples. 
41. Report to Hon. Emmet G. Sullivan of Inves-
tigation Conducted Pursuant to the Court's 
Order, dated April 7, 2009 at 2, In re Special 
Proceedings, No. 09-0198 (EGS) (D. D.C. Nov. 14, 
2011). 
42 . Id., at 32. 
43. Id., at 1. 
44. Id., at 28. 
45. Id., at 29 (emphasis added) . 
46. Id., at 30-31. 
Sixth Ame11dme11t 
In all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right 
to a speedy and public trial, by 
an impartial jury of the State 
and district wherein the crime 
shall have been committed, 
which district shall have been 
previously ascertained by 
law, and to be informed of 
the nature and cause of the 
accusation; to be confronted 
with the witnesses against him; 
to have compulsory process for 
obtaining witnesses in his favor, 
and to have the Assistance of 
Counsel for his defence 
in camera Brady review.47 Ken Ander-
son, then Williamson County Dis-
trict Attorney and now a Williamson 
County Superior Court Judge, was 
asked point blank by the trial court 
before the trial if he had "any infor-
mation favorable to the accused," and 
he replied, "No, sir." 
In fact, more than two decades 
after the trial, when post-conviction 
DNA tests on a bloody bandana left 
near the point of exit exonerated 
Morton and identified the real per-
petrator, undisclosed exculpatory 
evidence was discovered in Sgt. 
Wood's files through an open record 
47. Report to Court of Michael W. Morton at 3, 
State of Texas v. Michael W. Morton, No. 86-452-
K26 (26th Dist. Ct. Tex. Dec. 19, 2011). 
48. Id., at 16-18. 
49. The Court of Inquiry, Article 52 .08 of the 
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure is like a public 
grand jury or preliminary hearing except that 
it allows a private citizen to produce credible 
evidence before a court of general jurisdiction 
that the laws of Texas have been violated. It is 
ava ilable by design for private parties to bring 
actions against pubic officials, including prose-
cutors, who might otherwise not be investigated 
and charged for political reasons . Hence, there 
are three judicial findings necessary by three 
different judges before an arrest warrant can 
issue and a tri al held before yet a fourth judge. 
(http:// w w w. s ta tu tes .leg is.state. tx. us/ Docs/ 
CR/htm/CR.52.htm). 
act request. These exculpatory docu-
ments included a transcript of a taped 
interview between Wood and Mor-
ton's mother-in-law, Rita Kirkpat-
rick, where she described Morton's 
three-and-a-half-year-old son Eric 
saying he had witnessed the murder. 
Eric provided a detailed, chilling 
account of how a "monster" with 
"red gloves" beat his mother, and he 
offered a number of detailed obser-
vations that precisely corroborate 
the crime scene and the manner of 
the victim's death. When Kirkpatrick 
advised Sgt. Wood to stop looking at 
her son-in-law as the murderer and 
to go after the "monster," Sgt. Wood 
speculated that Eric didn't recognize 
his own father because Morton was 
disguised. He then asked Kirkpatrick 
to keep what she had heard confiden-
tial. 
There was also a report recount-
ing statements made by a neighbor of 
Morton right after the murder noting 
that the neighbor had observed, 
on several occasions, "a male park 
a green van on the street behind 
[the Mortons's] address, then the 
subject would get out and walk into 
the wooded area off the road" as if 
COMSTOCK 
he were casing the place for a home 
invasion. This "green van" report 
clearly supported Morton's theory 
of defense that someone had entered 
the house to commit a burglary from 
the wooded area after Morton left for 
work in the morning and then mur-
dered Christine Morton, who was 
sleeping.48 
Notwithstanding the order for 
in camera Brady inspection of Sgt. 
Wood's file and a direct inquiry by the 
court about the existence of exculpa-
tory evidence, neither the "Kirkpat-
rick" statement nor the "green van" 
report were submitted to the trial 
judge or disclosed to defense counsel, 
even though versions of those docu-
ments were in both Sgt. Wood's file 
and Anderson's trial file. 
Taking advantage of an unusual 
Texas procedure, the Court of 
Inquiry,49 Morton's defense team 
produced sworn testimony and evi-
dence obtained in Morton's post-
conviction habeas proceeding to 
make a probable cause showing that 
Ken Anderson had violated the laws 
of Texas by suppressing exculpatory 
in the Morton prosecution. Judge Sid 
Harle made the first probable cause 






finding under the Court of Inquiry 
procedure. The chief judge accepted 
the finding and appointed Judge 
Lewis Sturm to review the evidence 
and determine whether Judge Ander-
son should be arrested and tried. 
After a five-day evidentiary 
hearing, on April 19, 2013, 27 years 
after Morton was convicted, Judge 
Ken Anderson was arrested in the 
Williamson County Courthouse and 
charged with Criminal Contempt, 
Texas Government Code § 21.002(a), 
Tampering With or Fabricating Phys-
ical Evidence, Texas Penal Code § 
37.09; and Tampering with Govern-
ment Records, Texas Penal Code § 
37.10.50 
Whatever the outcome of crimi-
nal or the state bar charges against 
Judge Anderson, the impact of the 
Morton Court of Inquiry in Texas has 
been significant. John Bradley, Ken 
Anderson's protege and successor as 
Williamson County District Attor-
ney, was not re-elected. The "Michael 
Morton" discovery reform law was 
passed by the Republican controlled 
Texas legislature on May 13, 2013, on 
the 50th anniversary of Brady, with 
support from District Attorney's 
Association and the Texas Criminal 
Defense Lawyers Association. The 
Morton law expands discovery dis-
closure generally, and, most impor-
tantly, it adopts the ethical rule 
standard-prosecutors must timely 
disclose all information that "tends 
to negate guilt or mitigate punish-
ment" -an obligation that can easily 
be converted into an ethical rule 
order by state trial judges. 51 Another 
law passed as a result of the Morton 
case, the Prosecutor Accountability 
Act, requires at least a public censure 
if a prosecutor violates the ethics rule 
requiring disclosure of exculpatory 
evidence. 52 And many district attor-
neys in Texas are instituting "open 
file" discovery policies, claiming it's 
the best way to avoid Brady prob-
lems and to reassure the public they 
are playing fairly. The take-home 
message is that simply exposing a 
'bad-apple' prosecutor for willful and 
deliberate misconduct is not enough; 
rather, a serious and rapid sanction 
for even one 'bad apple' is what gets 
the criminal justice community, and 
the political elites, to pay attention. 
In the same fashion, the ethical 
rule order will both generally and 
specifically deter 'bad-apple' pros-
ecutors because it is not subject to 
many of the practical and procedural 
hurdles that have obstructed punish-
ment even for deliberate, intentional, 
and malicious Brady violations. 
Ordinarily, the remedy for a Brady 
violation is the reversal of the convic-
tion because the suppressed exculpa-
tory evidence was "material." After 
looking at the record, an appellate 
court decides that the suppressed 
evidence created a reasonable prob-
ability of a different outcome such 
that confidence in the integrity of 
the verdict is undermined. While 
Brady was not about deterrence,53 
some believe that district attorneys, 
embarrassed when a conviction is 
reversed for withholding exculpa-
tory evidence, will take ameliorative 
steps. They will punish the offend-
ing prosecutor or, when no one was 
at fault, fix the systemic breakdown 
that caused the failure to disclose in 
the first place. Indeed, the Supreme 
Court has relied on this justifica-
tion in Imbler v. Pachtman54 when it 
established absolute immunity for 
prosecutors from civil suits, insofar 
as the prosecutor is functioning in an 
adversarial, not investigative capac-
50. It should be noted that Anderson may have 
some success raising the statute of limitations 
successfully as an affirmative defense to the 
tampering charges, but that defense is unlikely 
to defeat the Criminal Contempt allegation. 
There may not even be a statute of limitations in 
Texas for Criminal Contempt, or if there is one, 
it runs from the time of discovery. Anderson is 
also facing state bar ethics charges arising out 
of the same conduct. 
51. Texas Senate Bill 1611, unanimously 
approved by the House on May 13, 2013, the 
fiftieth anniversary of Brady, requires in Section 
2(h) disclosure of "any exculpatory, impeach-
ment, or mitigating document, item or infor-
mation in the possession, custody or control 
of the state that tends to negate the guilt of 
the defendant or would tend to reduce punish-
ment for the offense charged." (http://www. 
capitol.state.tx.us/tlodocs/83R/billtext/html/ 
SB016111.htm). 
52 . Texas Senate Bill 825 . (http://www. 
legis. state. tx . us /tlodocs /8 3 R / b ii I text/ h tm I/ 
SB008251.htm). 
53. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); 
supra n. 6., at 87. 
54. 424 us 409 (1976). 
55. "We emphasize that the immunity of pros-
ecutors from liability in suits under s 1983 
3 3 2 JUDICATIJRE * MAY / J U N E 2 0 1 3 * VO L 9 6 NO 6 
ity.55 In a recent brief to the Supreme 
Court, urging the further narrowing 
of section 1983 liability for pros-
ecutorial misconduct, the National 
District Attorneys Association and 
the Association of State Attorneys 
General have underscored the deter-
rent value of the very threat of bar 
discipline, criminal prosecution, and 
political embarrassment.56 
But even if some district attorneys 
are taking such action when convic-
tions are vacated, this approach does 
nothing to identify district attor-
neys or individual prosecutors who 
deliberately suppress exculpatory 
evidence in "harmless error" cases. 
Cases involving obviously-guilty 
defendants are not likely to engen-
der much public outrage or impetus 
for action. Those prosecutors will 
escape public scrutiny and public 
punishment. In contrast, the ethical 
rule order offers a remedy through 
which the defense bar can take direct 
action against individual prosecu-
tors who deserve to be sanctioned, 
in front of the judge whose order was 
violated. 
Like the Morton case, and unlike 
the Ted Stevens matter, violations of 
an ethical rule order are more likely 
to result in contempt citations, bar 
discipline, or even criminal pros-
ecution. It allows the judge who 
issued the order to enforce it directly 
does not leave the public powerless to deter 
misconduct or to punish that which occurs. 
This Court has never suggested that the policy 
considerations which compel civil immunity 
for certain governmental officials also place 
them beyond the reach of the criminal law. Even 
judges, cloaked with absolute civil immunity 
for centuries, could be punished criminally for 
willful deprivations of constitutional rights on 
the strength of 18 U.S.C. s 242, the criminal 
analog of s 1983. O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 
503, 94 S. Ct. 669, 679, 38 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974); cf. 
Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 627, 92 S.Ct. 
2614, 2628, 33 L.Ed.2d 583 (1972). The pros-
ecutor would fare no better for his willful act. 
Moreover, a prosecutor stands perhaps unique, 
among officials whose acts could deprive 
persons of constitutional rights, in his amenabil-
ity to professional discipline by an association 
of his peers. These checks undermine the argu-
ment that the imposition of civil liability is the 
only way to insure that prosecutors are mindful 
of the constitutional rights of persons accused of 
crime." Imbler, at 428-429. 
56. Brief for the National Association of Assis-
tant United States Attorneys and National Dis-
trict Attorneys Assoication as Amicus Curiae 
in support of Petitioners, at 14, Pottawattamie 
County v. McGhee (No. 08-1065). 
through a contempt citation without 
having to wait for the prosecutor's 
office to take action. Atthe same time, 
since contempt has to be knowing 
and deliberate, inexperienced, neg-
ligent, or ill-trained prosecutors will 
not be sanctioned, thereby assuring 
the legal community this remedy is 
reserved for those who truly deserve 
punishment. Moreover, a contempt 
citation can be immediately appealed 
and will surely generate some useful 
precedent quickly. And, perhaps 
most significantly, since contempt 
is a continuing offense, the statute 
of limitations in most states will not 
bar prosecution or will run from the 
time of discovery. 
The Innocence Project will con-
tinually publish an online list of all 
judges who grant ethical rule orders 
so that they are immediately available 
to all. Please inform us of any orders 
or problems with this approach at 
ethicalruleorder@innocenceproject. 
org. And AJS could be instrumental in 
persuading judges to adopt this prac-
tice. A model Ethical Rule Standing 
Order, drafted by Judge Gertner, can 
be found on page 335 of this issue of 
Judicature. 
Renovate Manson 
Eyewitness identification remains 
the leading cause of wrongful con-
viction of the innocent in the United 
States. In the 307 post-convic-
tion DNA exonerations that have 
occurred in the United States since 
1989,57 inaccurate eyewitness testi-
mony contributed to wrongful con-
victions in over 75 percent of those 
cases. The Registry of Wrongful 
Convictions, which reviews "non-
DNA exonerations" as well as DNA 
exonerations, and differentiates 
between "mistaken" eyewitnesses 
5 7. http://www.innocenceproject.org/under-
stand/Eyewi tness-M isidenti fication . php. last 
accessed on June 3, 2013. 
58. http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exon-
eration/Pages/detail list.aspx, last accessed June 
3, 2013. 
59. The field study achieved "random assign-
ment" and yielded a rich set of results that will 
lie of enormous benefit to the law enforcement 
for the remaining decade. 
60. http ://theiacp.org/ About/WhatsN ew / 
tabid/459/?id=1951&v=l last accessed June 3, 
2013 . 
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EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION REMAINS 
THE LEADING CAUSE OF WRONGFUL 
CONVICTION OF THE INNOCENT 
IN THE UNITED STATES . 
***************************** 
and eyewitnesses who are lying, still 
lists misidentification as the leading 
cause.58 
In 2005-2006, a field study con-
ducted in Illinois tested double-blind 
sequential procedures versus tra-
ditional simultaneous lineup pro-
cedures. The methodology of the 
Illinois study was widely criticized 
and the validity of its results ques-
tioned. However, it still raised ques-
tions for some in law enforcement 
about the effectiveness of procedural 
reforms that no scientist was seri-
ously questioning, including sequen-
tial lineups. As a consequence, AJS, 
the Innocence Project, the John Jay 
School of Criminal Justice, and the 
Police Foundation did a field study 
in four cities to resolve, among other 
issues, the comparative utility of 
sequential blind versus simultaneous 
blind presentations.59 This AJS field 
study accelerated momentum among 
law ·enforcement and state policy 
makers to adopt eyewitness reforms 
generally. In particular, the Interna-
tional Association of Chiefs of Police 
(IACP) made "Wrongful Convictions" 
its primary policy last year, culmi-
nating in a summit and issuance of an 
exemplary set of policy recommen-
dations on eyewitness identification 
procedures as well as commitment to 
training departments.60 
The AJS field study is not the only 
support for reforming procedures. 
Since the mid-1970s, experimental 
psychologists have studied the psy-
chological processes and reliability 
of eyewitness memory and identi-
fication. Derived from laboratory 
experiments, recommended proce-
dural reforms for conducting identi-
fication to improve the accuracy of 
eyewitness identification include: 
• Double-blind administration: 
The person administering the lineup 
does not know which individual is 
the suspect; 
• Cautionary instructions: Prior 
to viewing the lineup, the witness is 
instructed that the perpetrator may 
or may not be in the lineup, that the 
witness need not make an identifica-
tion, and that the administrator does 
not know which individual is the 
suspect; 
• Lineup composition and filler 
selection: Persons, other than the 
suspect, participating in the lineup 
fit the general descriptions of the 
perpetrator, and the suspect does 
not unduly stand out from the non-
suspect fillers; 
• Immediately after identification, 
the witness is asked to describe his/ 
her certainty in making the identifi-
cation. 
• Sequential lineup presentation: 
Lineup photographs are shown one 
at a time, rather than all at once. 
Whatever the pace of eyewitness 
reforms-either implemented by 
state and local law enforcement, vol-
untarily or legislatively required-
eyewitness identifications come to 
courts for pre-trial assessment and, 
if the case proceeds to trial, evalua-
tion by juries. For this reason alone, 
making sure courts appraise this 
evidence with sophistication and in 
accordance with good and established 
scientific findings is critical. The aim 
is not simply in spreading aware-
ness of the extraordinary scientific 
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advances in experimental psychol-
ogy over the last 30 years, it is even 
more important to develop a frame-
work that makes sure the courts do 
not lag too far behind the science 
again, while also not getting too far 
ahead of the data. Moreover, there 
are good reasons to believe that 
establishing a legal framework in 
the area of eyewitness identifica-
tion testimony can be an influential 
example of how similar issues inter-
secting law and science can be adju-
dicated. 
Two recent landmark decisions 
in the area of eyewitness identifica-
tion evidence, State v. Henderson in 
New Jersey61 and State v. Lawson in 
Oregon,62 have provided a blueprint 
for state courts to re-evaluate and 
revise their legal architecture for the 
assessment and regulation of eye-
witness testimony based on a com-
prehensive and in-depth assessment 
of the findings from experimental 
psychology that have occurred since 
Manson v. Braithwaite63 was decided 
by the U.S. Supreme Court. 
In Henderson, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court undertook an 
exemplary procedure that greatly 
enhanced its adjudicative process. 
It appointed a distinguished retired 
judge, the Hon. Geoffery Gaulkin, 
to serve as a special master and 
conduct an extensive hearing about 
the eyewitness identification science 
and whether the Manson legal archi-
tecture was still "appropriate."64 
Judge Gaulkin's comprehensive 
"science" findings about the effect of 
"system" and "estimator" variables65 
on eyewitness identification were 
adopted almost without exception 
by the Henderson Court and remain 
an extremely valuable resource for 
researchers and courts reviewing 
these issues. 
Relying on its supervisory powers 
and on state constitutional grounds, 
the Henderson Court rejected the 
Manson balancing test (the balance of 
"suggestive procedures" against five 
"reliability factors") as scientifically 
confounded for failing to take into 
account how suggestive procedures 
themselves and confirming feedback 
can falsely inflate "reliability factors" 
based on witness self-reports (oppor-
tunity to observe, certainty, and 
attention). The Court also faulted the 
Manson test for ignoring the effect 
of relevant estimator variables like 
stress, lighting, and race, which can 
and do affect reliability, unless an 
identification procedure was found 
to be impermissibly suggestive.66 
As remedies, the Henderson Court 
proposed more extensive pre-trial 
hearings, jury instructions reflecting 
generally accepted scientific findings 
about probable effects, motions in 
limine, and use of experts. Of special 
interest and importance are the post-
Henderson jury instructions that 
were produced by a jury instruction 
committee and ultimately approved 
by the court.67 
The Lawson decision adopted Hen-
derson's science findings and rejec-
tion of Manson, but grounded its 
new legal architecture on the state 
evidence code that, in turn, tracks 
the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE). 
This aspect of Lawson is significant 
and will be helpful analytically for 
both state and federal judges. An 
evidence code framework is gener-
ally understood in state and federal 
courts, and "evidentiary principles" 
should not be conflated with "due 
process concerns." Last term, in 
Perry v. New Hampshire, the Supreme 
Court held that "the Due Process 
Clause does not require a prelimi-
nary judicial inquiry into the reliabil-
ity of an eyewitness identification 
when the identification was not pro-
cured under unnecessary sugges-
tive circumstances arranged by law 
enforcement." (Emphasis added.) 68 
But the Lawson Court appropri-
ately stresses, as a matter of state 
evidence law, "there is no reason to 
hinder the analysis of eyewitness 
reliability with purposeless distinc-
tions between suggestiveness and 
other sources of unreliability."69 
Under Lawson, following a tradi-
tional evidence code model, once a 
criminal defendant files a pre-trial 
motion to exclude eyewitness iden-
tification evidence, the state, as the 
proponent of the evidence, must 
establish all preliminary facts neces-
sary to establish the admissibility of 
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the eyewitness evidence under the 
equivalent of FRE 104.70 When an 
issue raised in a pre-trial challenge to 
the eyewitness evidence specifically 
implicates issues under the equiva-
lent of FRE 602 and 701, the state's 
preliminary showing must include, at 
a minimum, proof that the proffered 
eyewitness has personal knowledge 
of the matters to which the witness 
will testify (FRE 602), and that any 
identification is both rationally 
based on the witness's first-hand 
perceptions and helpful to the trier 
of fact (FRE 701).71 If the state makes 
this showing, then the burden shifts 
to the defendant to establish under 
the equivalent of FRE 40372 that, 
although the eyewitness evidence is 
otherwise admissible, the probative 
value of the evidence is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury. 
The court can either suppress the 
identification on that basis or fashion 
an appropriate intermediate remedy 
short of exclusion to cure the unfair 
prejudice or other dangers attending 
the use of that evidence. These "inter-
mediate remedies" would include 
motions in Ii mine that have frequently 
been granted in identification 
61. 27 A.3d 872 (N.J. 2011). 
62 . S059234. 
63. 432 U.S. 98 (1977). 
64. In addition to reading the Henderson deci-
sion itself and the Special Master's Report, it 
would extremely useful to read Chief Justice 
Stuart Rabner's thoughtful reflections on the 
decision making process that led to Henderson. 
See Evaluating Eyewitness Identification Evidence 
in the 21st Century, 87 NYU L. REV. 1249 (2013). 
65. "System variables" refer to the circum-
stances surrounding the identification proce-
dure itself that are generally within the control 
of those administering the procedure. "Estima-
tor" variables generally refer to characteristics 
of the witness, the alleged perpetrator, and 
the environmental conditions of the event that 
cannot be manipulated or adjusted by state 
actors . Lawson, Supra n. 61 at 17-18. 
66. Henderson, 27 A.3d at 918. 
67. See http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/press-
re1/2012/pr120719a.htm. Last accessed June 3, 
2013. 
68. Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S.Ct. 716, 730 
(2012). 
69. Supra n. 62, at 25. 
70. http://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/fre/rule 
_104, last accessed June 4, 2013. 
71. See http://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/ 
fre/rule_602 and http://www.law.cornell.edu/ 
rules/fre/rule_701, last accessed June 4, 2013. 
72 . http://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/fre/ 
rule_ 403, last accessed June 4, 2013. 
cases.73 The decision whether to 
admit, exclude, or fashion an appro-
priate intermediate remedy short of 
exclusion is committed to the sound 
exercise of the trial court's discre-
tion. 
This Lawson evidentiary code 
approach makes eminent sense for at 
least three reasons. First, as a purely 
practical matter, the prosecution has 
the best access to information as to 
how identification procedures were 
conducted and the circumstances 
surrounding the observations of the 
witness. The "due process" approach 
that puts the burden on the defense 
to prove suggestion without the 
ability to depose the eyewitness or 
those who administered the identifi-
cation procedure is problematic and 
results in unproductive sparring and 
ill-informed motions. 
Second, the evidence code 
approach allows trial courts to iden-
tify factors that scientific research 
shows substantially undermine the 
reliability of eyewitness evidence 
that can arise, even if unnecessarily 
suggestive actions by state actors 
never occur. This has the added 
advantage of being logical: "A trial 
court tasked with determining a 
constitutional claim must neces-
sarily assume that the evidence is 
otherwise admissible; were it inad-
missible on evidentiary grounds, 
the court would never reach the 
constitutional question. However, a 
trial court tasked with considering 
a question of evidentiary admissibil-
ity clearly cannot begin by assum-
ing admissibility."74 And finally, the 
Lawson evidence code approach 
treats eyewitness memory like mal-
leable "trace evidence" that can be 
contaminated by improper handling 
and degraded by environmental 
insults and extended storage time. 
73. Such motions include precluding a witness 
from testifying about certainty in court if a 
confidence statement was not taken at the time 
of the original identification. or the kind of jury 
instructions that New Jersey has fashioned that 
warn juries about the risk of misidentification if 
certain "sys tem variable" best practices are not 
fo llowed, or certain "estimator" variables create 
risks of misidentification, like cross-racial situ-
ations or "weapon focus." 
74. ld. 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS 
__ _,D.J. 
ETHICAL RULE 3,8 ORDER FOR 
THE DISCLOSURE OF EVIDENCE 
________ , 20 __ 
The defendant has moved for an order under A.B.A. Rule 3.8 [and 
other local ethical rules] requiring the prosecutor, in the language of 
the ethical rule, to "make timely disclosure to the defense of all evi-
dence or information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate 
the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense." In addition, Rule 
3.8 requires that the prosecutor, in. connection with sentencing, "dis-
close to the defense and to [the Court] all unprivileged mitigating 
information know to the prosecutor." 
Defendant has specifically outlined examples of such information 
relevant to the case at bar - on both fronts - information negating 
.guilt as wen as information mitigating the offense. And the defendant 
has listed the agencies and investig~tors likely to be in possession of 
such information. Such information includes, but is not limited to, 
the following [insert description of information]. 
The information that is the subject of the Defendant's motion fits 
within the provisions of the ethical rule, as well as the Government's 
constitutional obligations under Brady v. Maryland, and as such, the 
Government is ORDERED to 
a) produce such information described above to the defense within 
xxx days of this order; 
b) produce such additional information as (its within the govern-
ment's continuing obligation to disclose Rule 3.8/ .Br.ad.y information. 
The Government shall be given an opportunity to object to the pro-
vision of this information by filing an ex parte motion, outlining why 
timely disclosure would endanger a witness or otherwise unfairly 
prejudice the prosecution before trial, together with the relevant 
Rule 3.8 materials for the court's in camera review. The parties are 
on notice that willful and deliberate failure to comply with this order 
is punishable by contempt. 
SO ORDERED. 
Date: ___ _ ,20_ Isl ' 
______ U.S.D.C. 
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This is not only a good legal analogy, 
but fits the biological and cognitive 
findings of neuroscientists as well as 
experimental psychologists. 
To be sure, more work needs to be 
done, but the Henderson and Lawson 
Courts have taken major steps 
forward toward the development of 
a robust judicial framework for the 
assessment of eyewitness evidence 
based on sound science. These deci-
sions reflect judging at its best and 
should be emulated. AJS's work in 
this area should continue apace, pro-
viding the necessary data and poten-
tial reforms for judges, legislators, 
and law enforcement to use. 
Encourage Videotaping of 
Interrogations, and Adopt an 
Evidence Code Approach to the 
Reliability of Confessions 
The trace evidence analogy applies 
with equal force to the issue of false 
confessions-a leading cause of the 
conviction of the innocent. Interro-
gations must be properly preserved 
to prevent the "contamination" (the 
inadvertent or deliberate feeding of 
facts that only the real perpetrator 
or the police would know) and the 
"formatting" (suggestions by police 
about narrative and motivation) of 
a confession. Recent research from 
wrongful conviction cases has dem-
onstrated both the prevalence and 
persuasive power of contaminated 
and formatted false confession.75 
The full electronic recording of an 
interrogation is essential to accu-
rate fact-finding about a confes-
sion's reliability. In the absence of 
a full recording of the entire inter-
rogation from start to finish, there 
is simply no way for prosecutors, 
judges, juries, and appellate courts 
to detect whether police interroga-
tors have contaminated/formatted 
the suspect's false confession. 
Eighteen states and the District of 
Columbia now mandate videotap-
ing of interrogations, and a number 
of states initiated this practice 
because the judiciary directly sug-
gested it by either setting up an 
advisory commission or issuing jury 
instructions that an adverse infer-
ence should be drawn if an interro-
gation were not videotaped.76 
But just as the adoption of best 
practices in the eyewitness identifi-
cation area must be married to a new 
framework for evaluating evidence 
in light of new scientific findings, 
the same is true in the area of false 
confessions. Scholars and scientific 
experts have long urged the that 
"constitutional" rule announced in 
Colorado v. Connelly,77 focusing just on 
whether a confession is "voluntary," 
must be supplemented by a pre-trial 
examination that examines the "reli-
ability" of a confession.78 Although 
the best solution here would be 
statutory fixes that mandate pre-
trial reliability hearings and sup-
pression on that ground, advocates 
and courts would be wise to under-
take a reliability inquiry using an 
evidence code approach similar 
to the one adopted by the Oregon 
Supreme Court in Lawson.79 This 
suggestion has been made before, 
but new work by leading scholars in 
the field is sure to build momentum 
along these lines.80 AJS and]udicature 
could support these scholarly efforts 
to bolster the case for the adoption 
75. Sara Appleby et al., Po/ice-Induced Confes-
sions: An Empirical Analysis of Their Content and 
Impact, 19 PSYCHOL. CRIME & L. 111-128 (2011) . 
Brandon Garrett, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: 
WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS Go WRONG 
39-40 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press 2011); Brandon Garrett, The Substance 
of False Confessions, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1051, 
1078 (2010) ; Richard A. Leo, POLICE INTER· 
ROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE 181 (Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press 2008); 
Richard A. Leo, et al, Bringing Reliability Back 
in: False Confessions and Legal Safeguards in 
the Twenty-First Century, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 479 
(2006); Richard A. Leo & Steven Drizin, The 
Three Errors: Pathways to False Confession and 
Wrongful Conviction, in POLICE INTERROGATIONS 
AND FALSE CONFESSIONS: CURRENT RESEARCH, 
PRACTICE, AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 9-30 
(Daniel Lassiter & Christian Meissner, eds., 
Amer. Psychological Ass'n 2010); Saul Kassin 
& Christian Meissner, He's Guilty: Investigator 
Bias in Judgments of Truth and Deception, 26 
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 469-480 (2002); Christian 
Meissner & Saul Kassin, You 're Guilty, So Just 
Confess!: Cognitive and Behavioral Confirmation 
Biases in the Interrogation Room, in INTERROGA-
TIONS, CONFESSIONS, AND ENTRAPMENT 85-106 
(Daniel Lass iter, ed ., Kluwer Academic/Plenum 
Press 2004). 
76. http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/ 
False_ Confessions __ Recording_ Of_ Custodia I_ 
Interrogations.php, last accessed June 3, 2013. 
In six states, the supreme court ordered the 
recording of confessions. 640 jurisdictions vol-
untarily adopted the practice. 
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of mandatory video recording of all 
confessions. 
These four reforms top my list of 
priorities for the criminal justice 
system. Of course, there are many 
other reforms that would allevi-
ate case backlogs, create a more 
fair and equitable justice system, 
and increase public support for the 
courts and the administration of 
justice. However, adoption of these 
four-a supported and effective 
public defense system; routine issu-
ance of ethical rule orders; and new 
procedures to enhance reliability 
of both eyewitness testimony and 
confessions-would go a long way 
toward those overall goals. * 
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